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Although there has been research looking at the 
relationship between the structure of the financial system 
and economic growth, much less work has dealt with 
the importance of bank-based versus market-based 
financial systems for poverty and income distribution. 
Empirical evidence has indicated that the structure of 
the financial system has little relevance for economic 
growth, suggesting that the same could be true for 
poverty since growth is an important driver in reducing 
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poverty. Some theories, however, claim that, by reducing 
information and transaction costs, the development of 
bank-based financial systems could exert a particularly 
large impact on the poor. This paper looks at a sample of 
47 developing economies from 1984 through 2008. The 
results suggest that when institutions are weak, bank-
based financial systems are better at reducing poverty 
and, as institutions develop, market-based financial 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
While financial development and its effects on economic growth have attracted considerable 
attention in the literature, far less work has been done on the relationship between financial 
deepening and poverty. More particularly, few studies have looked into the possible 
importance of the structure of the financial system, i.e. whether financial intermediation is 
performed through banks or markets, for poverty reduction. Yet, lack of access to finance has 
been argued to be one of the main factors behind persistent poverty.  
 
Furthermore, financial development is a complex process involving a number of 
intermediaries. Recent empirical studies have argued that, while necessary, financial 
liberalization may not be sufficient to foster an environment where the financial sector could 
function effectively. The strength of the legal environement, institutional reforms related to 
property rights and creditor information are crucial. Yet, the most common measure for 
financial development—private credit—does not directly capture these dimensions. 
 
This paper aims to contribute to the literature in several ways. First, it tries to capture the role 
of the structure of the financial system in reducing poverty. Second, it examines in particular 
the role of the quality of institutions in shaping the link between financial structure and 
poverty. Third, it looks specifically at developing countries, reaching more conclusive results 
on the role of the bank- versus market-based systems than studies with global coverage.  
 
The results suggest that the structure of the financial system does play an important role in 
reducing poverty in developing countries. Financial deepening achieved through the 
expansion of banks contributes to poverty reduction, implying that more bank-based financial 
systems tend to do better in lifting people out of poverty. But as institutions grow stronger, 
market-based financial systems can turn to be beneficial to the poor.  
 
In what follows, Section II reviews the literature; Section III discusses the data, describes the 
methodology, and presents the results; and Section IV draws some conclusions. 
 
II.   THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
A.   Finance and poverty 
Financial development could help the poor through several channels. First, it has been argued 
that lack of access to finance is one of the main factors behind persistent poverty (Levine, 
2008). Because of the high unit costs of small-scale lending and other imperfections, the poor 
cannot borrow against future earnings to invest.  
 
The provision of improved financial services could also make it easier for entrepreneurs and 
household to manage risks and, thereby, expand their economic opportunities (Stiglitz, 1974; 
Newberry, 1977; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Townsend, 1982; and Bardhan et al., 2000). A 
drop in the fixed cost of managing risk would disproportionately benefit poor households. 
 
Finally, financial development could affect the economic opportunities and outcomes of 
households without directly influencing their use of financial services (Beck et al., 2009; 3 
 
 
Gine and Townsend, 2004; and Townsend and Ueda, 2006). For example, financial 
development by enhancing economic activity could boost the demand for labor. If this 
increased labor demand falls primarily on low-skilled workers, this indirect effect of 
financial development could increase the income of the poor and reduce income inequality. 
Thus, even if financial development does not increase the direct use of financial services by 
the poor, it might alleviate poverty and tighten the income distribution by creating job 
opportunities for the poor. 
 
Similarly, financial development could intensify the competition in the non-financial sector 
by reducing the barriers to the entry of new firms. According to Becker (1957), this increased 
competition could reduce discrimination in hiring workers and expand the economic 
opportunities of disadvantaged groups, i.e. the poor. 
 
Empirically, many studies looking at micro data find evidence of a positive correlation 
between access to finance and poverty. Jacoby (1994), for instance, finds that lack of access 
to credit perpetuates poverty in Peru because poor households cannot afford to provide their 
children with appropriate education. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) show that households from 
Indian villages without access to credit markets tend to reduce their children’s schooling 
when transitory shocks reduce their income. Similarly, Dehejia and Gatti (2003) and Beegle 
et al. (2003) show that child labor rates are higher in countries with poorly functioning 
financial systems.  
 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) and Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) find evidence to 
support the risk diversification view. Their results suggest that low-wealth households 
without access to services that would help to manage their risks choose lower-return, lower-
risk activities compared to households without these constraints. 
 
Turning to the job creation channel, Burgess and Pande (2005) look at India’s policy on bank 
branches that led to the opening of thousands of new rural bank branches in states with 
initially low levels of financial development. Their results suggest that opening a bank 
branch led to faster growth in wages of agricultural workers, while the wages of urban 
factory workers did not show the same time pattern.  
 
Beck et al. (2009) examine the effects of the deregulation of geographic restrictions on 
banking across individual states of the United States. They find that deregulation exerts a 
disproportionately positive increase in the demand for lower-skilled workers, which increases 
their annual earnings relative to higher-income individuals and, hence, narrows income 
disparities.  
 
Levine et al. (2009) study the same event to assess whether racial discrimination fell after 
states deregulated in the United States. They find that the difference between the wage rates 
of white males and black males narrowed after bank deregulation. Financial development 





Work using macro data are, however, less conclusive on a possible association between 
poverty and access to finance or job opportunities. Beck et al. (2007), Honohan (2004), 
Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2002), and Singh and Huang (2011) find that the degree of financial 
intermediation has a strong positive impact on the income of the poor. Jalilian and 
Kirkpatrick (2002) use the ratio of bank assets to GDP to measure financial intermediation in 
a sample of advanced and developing economies. Beck et al. (2007) and Honohan (2004), 
looking only at developing countries, capture the role of finance by considering private sector 
credit. Singh and Huang (2011) also use private sector credit, but with a sample covering 
only Sub-Saharan African countries.   
 
In contrast, Dollar and Kraay (2002) find that financial development does not affect the poor. 
They examine the relationship between the average income of the poorest quintile in a 
sample of advanced and developing economies, and measure financial depth using the ratio 
of commercial bank assets to total bank assets. Kraay (2004) reaches similar results studying 
the association between the change in absolute poverty and the ratio of M2 to GDP in a 
sample of developing countries. 
 
Finally, Guillaumont-Jeanneney and Kpodar (2011) suggest that the poor benefit primarily 
from the ability of the banking system to facilitate transactions and provide savings 
opportunities rather than reaping the benefit of greater access to credit. Looking at a sample 
of developing countries, they find a positive relationship between financial development and 
poverty if financial development is measured by the ratio of M3 to GDP. If private credit is 
used instead, the association turns out to be statistically insignificant.  
 
B.   Banks, markets and the institutional environment 
Financial institutions operate in settings where complete information is often not available. 
Entrepreneurs seeking financing normally have more information about their projects than 
their banks do. In this setting, from the viewpoint of a financial institution projects that may 
have different probabilities of success are indistinguishable. This information asymmetry 
requires banks to screen applications so as to grant loans only to the most promising projects 
(Singh, 1992). 
The lender cannot rely simply on increasing the interest rate, however. As Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) demonstrated, increases in the interest rate charged on loans may adversely affect the 
composition of the pool of borrowers. The expected return to the lender depends on the 
probability of repayment, so the lender would like to be able to identify borrowers who are 
more likely to repay. Those who are willing to borrow at high interest rates, however, may be 
riskier: they are willing to borrow at high interest rates because they perceive their 
probability of repaying the loan to be low. For a given expected return, an increase in interest 
rates will induce low-risk projects to drop out first, leaving only the riskier ones in the pool. 
Lenders could require collateral, which imposes a cost if the entrepreneur defaults. As the 
probability of failure is greater for high-risk projects, the same amount of collateral will 
reduce the expected profit of these projects by more than that of less risky ones. Bester 
(1985) demonstrated that lenders could design attractive contracts adapted to the various 
qualities of borrowers, leading to perfect sorting.  5 
 
 
In this setting, the poor, who have no formal collateral, or small enterprises that would be 
more likely to recruit the poor, would find it difficult to reap the benefits of a larger financial 
sector. Financial development would thus favor the rich and increase income inequality if not 
accompanied by reforms to deal with information problems (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; 
Galor and Zeira, 1993; Piketty, 1997). 
Alternatively, loan providers could invest in gathering additional information on projects that 
would lead to a better perception of the probability of success for a given project (Devinney, 
1986; Singh, 1994, 1997). In this regard, a number of authors have argued that banks would 
be better placed than markets in alleviating these informational problems. For instance, 
Diamond (1984), Boot and Thakor (1997), Boyd and Prescott (1986), and Ramakrishnan and 
Thakor (1984) stress the critical role banks play in easing information asymmetries and 
thereby improving resource allocation. Furthermore, banks frequently establish close, long-
term relations with firms and ease cash-flow constraints on existing firm expansion with 
positive ramifications on economic growth (Hoshi et al., 1991). By contrast, markets have 
been argued not to produce the same improvements (Bhide, 1993; Stiglitz, 1985). Stiglitz 
(1985), for instance, argues that well-developed markets quickly and publicly reveal 
information, which reduces the incentives for individual investors to acquire information.  
The importance of a market-based versus bank-based financial system may depend on 
existing institutions. According to this view, economies will benefit from becoming more 
market-based only as their institutional framework strengthens (Levine, 2002). Gerschenkron 
(1962), Boyd and Smith (1998), and Rajan and Zingales (1999) stress that banks can more 
effectively force firms to honor their contracts than atomistic markets and would thus be 
especially important in countries at early stages of development and with weak contract 
enforcement capabilities.  
 
As institutions in countries mature, the exchange of information becomes more efficient, 
reducing the cost of screening borrowers. In advanced countries, databases centralizing 
information on borrowers are often established by the private sector or maintained by central 
banks. These registries collect information on the standing of borrowers in the financial 
system and make it available to lenders. The system improves transparency, rewarding good 
borrowers and increasing the cost of default. Detragiache et al. (2005), Djankov et al. (2005), 
McDonald and Schumacher (2007), and Singh et al. (2009) all show that information-sharing 
is associated with greater financial development. 
 
The law and finance literature has stressed the importance of legal institutions (especially 
those protecting private property rights) in explaining international differences in financial 
development. Where legal systems enforce private property rights, support private contracts, 
and protect the legal rights of investors, lenders tend to be more willing to finance firms —in 
other words, stronger creditor rights tend to promote financial development (see Acemoglu 
and Johnson, 2005, Cottarelli et al., 2003, Dehesa et al., 2007, McDonald and Schumacher, 
2007, Singh et al., 2009, and Tressel and Detragiache, 2008).  
 
Hence, theoretically, given a certain level of institutional development, banks may have an 
advantage in dealing with information asymmetries compared to markets. If this is true, a 
bank-based financial system would be able to either provide better access to credit to poor 6 
 
 
households, offer them cheaper financial instruments to manage their risk, or finance the 
expansion of more firms that would be using their skills. The more a financial structure 
would be bank-oriented the narrower income inequalities and the lower poverty would be.  
 
Empirically, most studies looking at the structure of the financial system tend to suggest, 
however, that it is irrelevant. Beck and Levine (2004), Levine and Zevros (1998), and 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) use indices of stock market development and bank credit to the 
private sector to measure the finance-growth link. They show that that both banking sector 
and stock market developments positively influence economic growth. Looking at firm level 
data, Beck and Levine (2002) and Levine (2002) come to the conclusion that financial 
structure per se does not importantly explain industrial performance or the creation of new 
firms. 
 
Arestis, Demetriades, and Luintel (2000), nevertheless, suggest that banks could play a more 
important role. Using quarterly data and applying time series methods to five developed 
economies, they show that, while both banking sector and stock market development explain 
subsequent growth, the effects of banking sector development is substantially larger than that 
of stock market development. Honohan (2004) shows that bank credit reduces poverty while 
market indicators (capitalization and turnover) do not seem to have any significant effect. 
III.   EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A.   Sample 
We compiled data for a sample of 47 developing economies over the period 1984-2008. 
Developing countries are defined as countries classified by the World Bank as low- or 
middle-income countries. Excluding developed countries from the sample reduces sample 
heterogeneity. The sample size and the period of study are limited by the availability of data 
on poverty and stock market indicators. To smooth short-term fluctuations of macroeconomic 
variables and take into account the fact that yearly poverty indicators may not be available 
for many countries, we averaged the data over a 5-year period, which gives us up to five data 
points per country. 
 
B.   Econometric specification and definition of variables 
The model 
 
To assess the impact of the financial structure, we adopted a standard poverty model building 
on previous studies (see for instance Dollar and Kraay, 2002: Honohan, 2004: Guillaumont 
and Kpodar, 2011; and Singh and Huang, 2011). The model explains poverty by a core set of 
control variables including income per capita, inflation, trade openness and infrastructure. 








The baseline model is as follows: 
 
                                                                (1) 
 
where      is the indicator of poverty for a country i at a period t;      represents the level of 
income per capita;      is a set of control variables excluding income per capita;       and 
      are the sets of variables of interest accounting respectively for financial development 
and financial structure;    is the country specific effect and      is the error term.  
 
To test the importance of the quality of institutions, we adopted the following specification: 
 
                                                                                    (2) 
 
where        represents the institutional variable. The definition of the other variables 




Poverty. Poverty is complex. It has many faces, often changing from place to place and 
across time. Though it is usually defined as having insufficient resources or income, in its 
extreme form poverty is a lack of basic human needs, such as adequate food, clothing, 
housing, clean water, or health services. It is also a lack of education or opportunity, and may 
be associated with insecurity and fears for the future, lack of representation and freedom. 
 
The literature, which has generally focused on the economic aspect of poverty, mainly uses 
four related indicators of poverty: the headcount index and the poverty gap to measure 
absolute poverty; the Gini coefficient and the average income of the poorest quintile to 
measure relative poverty. This paper adopts the same approach.  
 
Several attempts have been made, however, to come up with an index of multidimensional 
poverty which captures access to education and health, access to basic needs such as 
electricity and clean water, and more importantly household assets and quality of institution 
(see for example Alkire and Santos, 2010). Aside from the common criticism on the choice 
of weights for such index, the sub-components of an index of multidimensional poverty and 
the index itself tend to be highly correlated with household income.
2 This would suggest that 
income-based poverty measures could indirectly capture to a large extent the many faces 
poverty has.  
 
                                                 
2 Alkire and Santos (2010) find a correlation coefficient of 0.85 between their multidimensional poverty index 
and headcount poverty. An index of multidimensional poverty also poses a challenge for empirical models 




The headcount index measures the percentage of the population living with per capita 
consumption or income below the poverty line, defined as US$1.25 a day. This is the most 
popular measure of poverty because, though arbitrary, it provides a quantifiable metric of 
people living in what a society at one point in time considers unacceptable conditions. 
  
The poverty gap takes into account the distance of the poor from the poverty line. This 
measure characterizes how far below the poverty line lies the average income of the poor and 
provides some sense of distribution. Unlike the headcount index, this indicator captures a 
decrease or increase in the income of the poor even when it does not cross the poverty line. 
 
The Gini coefficient, the measure most commonly used to describe income disparity, offers a 
comparative measure of poverty. Indicators based on the poverty line tend to describe 
poverty in absolute terms. Yet studies suggest that an individual’s welfare depends not only 
on absolute income but also on how his or her income compares with that of the rest of the 
population. Everyone could be above the poverty line, but the income distribution might be 
very skewed. The Gini coefficient is derived from the Lorenz curve, with larger values 
indicating greater income inequality. 
 
The income of the poorest quintile is defined as the average per capita income of the poorest 
20 percent of the population.  
 
Financial Structure. In line with Levine (2002), we adopt indicators of financial structure 
measuring the relative importance of stock markets with respect to banks (see also Luintel et 
al., 2008; and Andrianaivo, 2010). The literature typically distinguishes three dimensions of 
financial structure: size, activity, and efficiency. Financial structure size (structure-size 
henceforth) is the ratio of the size of stock markets, captured by stock market capitalization, 
to the size of the banking system. As the latter can be measured by three different indicators, 
namely the volume of credit granted by commercial banks to the private sector, the total 
value of bank assets, and the total value of banks deposits, we can derive three indicators of 
structure-size as follows: 
 
             
                           
                         (3) 
 
             
                           
                      (4) 
 
             
                           
                        (5) 
 
Financial structure activity (structure-activity henceforth) measures stock market activity 
compare to banking sector activity. While stock market activity is captured by the value of 
domestic equities traded on domestic exchanges, activity of financial intermediaries appears 
to be better measured by credit to the private sector, which has the advantage of being a good 
measure of both size and activity of banks. Another indicator of banking activity that could 
be considered is the loan-to-deposit ratio, though it is affected by prudential requirements. 9 
 
 
Indeed, a high loan-to-deposit ratio is not necessarily desirable as the banks might not have 
sufficient liquidity to meet the demand for withdrawals. Based on these indicators of activity 
of stock markets and banks, we therefore measure structure-activity as follows: 
 
            
                               
                        (6) 
 
            
 
                               
     
 
          
              
          (7) 
 
The last dimension is the efficiency of the financial structure (structure-efficiency 
henceforth) which compares stock market efficiency to that of banks. Following Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine (1999), stock market efficiency is measured by stock market total value 
traded to GDP, while bank overhead cost and net interest margin are used to gauge the 
efficiency of the banking sector. We then obtain the two following indicators of structure-
efficiency:
3   
 
                                                                             (8) 
 
                                                                         (9) 
 
Higher values of structure-size, structure-activity and structure-efficiency indicate a more 
market-based financial system, while low values of the same indicators reflect a more bank-
based financial system. The importance of using several indicators of financial structure lies 
in the fact that they represent various dimensions of a complex concept. As pointed out by 
Levine (2002) and Luintel et al. (2008), stock markets could be sizeable because of the large 
number of listings, but may have very little activity. Similarly, large banking systems may 
not be necessarily more efficient if high banking concentration hampers competition. 
 
To achieve a manageable number of variables in some of the regressions, aggregate measures 
for the financial structure are, however, needed. To this end, we followed the literature by 
constructing four aggregate measures of financial structure using the principal component 
factor method: 
 
                                                                                  (10) 
 
                                                                               (11) 
 
                                                                                (12) 
 
                                                                       (13) 
                                                 
3 Note that overhead cost and net interest margin are in fact measures of banking inefficiency, and therefore the 
inverse ratio could be considered as measure of bank efficiency. The ratio of stock market efficiency relative to 
banking sector efficiency is given by the following formula:        
                                 
 
 




where pcf stands for principal component factor 
 
Financial Development. We include in the model an indicator of both stock market and 
banking sector development. In line with previous studies, stock market development is 
measured by the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. Following Guillaumont and 
Kpodar (2011), we use the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP to capture banking sector 
development. We recognize, however, that this type of measure captures only the 
contribution of the formal financial sector, leaving out the potentially important role of the 
informal one, including microfinance. There are two reasons for this: (i) although the 
informal sector may represent a large number of institutions and loans, in the aggregate the 
credit it offers is usually dwarfed by that of formal financial institutions; (ii) when informal 
financial arrangements become economically substantive, they tend to be integrated into the 
formal sector. 
 
Institutions. Recently, indicators of institutional quality and governance have flourished, but 
many of them suffer from limited country and time coverage. Here, we opt for the widely 
used indicator of Law and Order—also called Rule of Law—compiled by International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system, 
and the popular observance of the law. This indicator ranges from 0 to 6, with a higher figure 
indicating a better quality and enforcement of the legal system (Laeven, 2002).  
 
Control Variables. In the baseline model, we include a core set of control variables that are 
commonly used as factors explaining poverty: overall income per capita, to capture the 
contribution of economic development (GDP per capita); growth of the consumer price 
index, to control for the macroeconomic environment (inflation); the length of the total road 
network to the country’s land area, to measure the quality of infrastructure and access to 
markets or services such as health and education (infrastructure); and the sum of exports and 
imports as a share of GDP, to capture the degree of international openness (trade openness).
4 
  
C.   Methodology 
To estimate the model, we use the System Generalized Method-of-Moment (GMM) 
estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). The estimator combines two sets of 
equations. The first set includes first-differenced equations where the right-hand-side 
variables are instrumented by the levels of the series lagged one period or more. The second 
set consists of the equations in levels with the right-hand side variables being instrumented 
by lagged first of higher-order differences.  
                                                 
4 Income per capita is expected to be negatively correlated with poverty incidence. In contrast, inflation is 
thought to be harmful to the poor as it may reduce the real value of wages and transfers (see for instance 
Easterly and Fischer, 2001). Well-developed infrastructure, measured by road density, is expected to be 
negatively correlated with poverty incidence. Finally, the impact of trade openness on poverty may be mixed. 
While high openness to trade can facilitate access to larger markets for the agricultural sector, in which the poor 
are often concentrated, trade liberalization involves distribution changes, which may not be always beneficial 




This estimator has several advantages that the finance and growth literature has pointed out.
5 
It takes into account country-specific effects, while allowing addressing issues associated 
with endogeneity, measurement errors, and omitted variables. By exploiting internal 
instruments, the System GMM estimator removes the often hard task of identifying valid 
external instruments consisting of variables that are correlated with the endogenous 
explanatory variable but not with the error term of the equation.  
 
The validity of these internal instruments (lagged variables in level and first differences) was 
not rejected. As suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), and Blundell and Bond (1998), a 
Sargan/Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions and a serial correlation test were carried 
out. In both instances, the null hypothesis could not be rejected (the instrumental variables 
are not correlated with the residual, and the errors exhibit no second-order serial correlation).   
 
In addition, to limit the risk of over-instrumentation, we keep the number of instruments to 
the minimum by using as instrument only the first valid lagged value of the right-hand side 
variables. We assume that financial variables are endogenous, therefore are instrumented by 
their second lag value, while the other variables, treated as predetermined, are instrumented 
by their first lag value. 
 
D.   Results 
Results for the estimations of equation (1) are presented in Table 1. Looking first at the level 
of financial sector development, the results would suggest that countries with deeper banking 
sector tend to have lower poverty rates; the coefficient on banking development is negative 
and significant in all regressions,
6 By contrast, stock market development appears to have no 
impact on poverty levels. 
 
Turning to the importance of the financial structure, a positive and significant coefficient of 
financial structure indicators would suggest that countries with bank-based financial systems 
tend to have lower levels of poverty than those with market-based financial systems. 
According to the size variable, this observation seems to be true: in 2 out of 3 specifications, 
the coefficient on the structure-size variable turns out positive and significant (columns 1 to 
3, Table1). Measures of the financial activity and efficiency do not seem, however, to affect 
poverty levels. Hence, relatively more vibrant banking systems in term of credit, and assets 
would be more conducive to lower levels of poverty. In contrast, relatively more dynamic 
stock markets with high turnover do not seem to make a difference (activity variable), even 
when relatively high banking costs are factored in (efficiency variable).   
 
The results related to the control variables are mostly in line with expectations. There is a 
strong negative relationship between income per capita and poverty incidence, suggesting 
                                                 
5 Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001) offer a good overview on GMM estimation of empirical growth models. 
6 The conclusion remains the same when private credit is used to measure banking sector development.   12 
 
 
that higher levels of economic development are associated with lower levels of poverty.  
There is an evidence of a threshold effect between inflation and poverty incidence: low and 
moderate inflation rates in the range of 1-2 percent are not detrimental to the poor; above this 
threshold the negative impact of inflation on the poor starts to materialize.
7 Trade openness 
and infrastructure development are not robustly linked to poverty, probably because any 
association between these two variables and poverty may be passing through economic 
development, which is already captured by our income per capita variable.  
 
We study next the influence of institutions. Results are presented in Table 2. To achieve a 
manageable number of regressions, we use the composite measures of structure-size, 
structure-activity and structure-efficiency as defined above. Using these composite measures 
confirm the previous results, namely that large stock markets relative to banks may not favor 
the poor, while active and efficient stock markets relative to banks seem not have any 
influence (columns 1 to 3, Table 2). The overall measure of financial structure, aggregating 
structure-size, structure-activity and structure-efficiency, does not appear with a significant 
coefficient, suggesting that overall the structure of the financial system may be irrelevant for 
poverty (column 4, Table 2).  
 
Introducing the quality of institutions in our model sheds more light on the complexity of the 
relationship between financial structure and poverty. Both the level of the quality of 
institutions and its interaction with the financial structure are examined. The results show 
first of all that strong institutions are associated with lower levels of poverty, as suggested by 
the negative and significant coefficient on the institutional variable (column 5 to 8, Table 2). 
 
In addition, the results indicate that the relationship between the financial structure and 
poverty may hinge on a country’s institutional development. The coefficients on activity and 
size become significant and positive, as well as that on the overall measure of the financial 
structure (columns 5 to 8, Table 2), suggesting that the statistical insignificance of the results 
in previous regressions actually reflected country heterogeneity with regard to institutional 
development. This would imply that overall given a certain institutional environment bank-
based financial systems tend to be associated with lower levels of poverty than market-based 
financial systems. 
 
The coefficients on the interaction terms with the financial variables all come out negative 
and significant. These results suggest that the negative association between a market-based 
financial system and poverty could diminish as institutions grow stronger and even reverse. 
These observations are consistent with the views that bank-based systems are more 
appropriate in countries with weak shareholder protection and property right enforcement, 
while economies benefit from more market-based systems when legal systems improve. 
 
The threshold for institutional development beyond which market-based systems could be 
more favorable to the poor is estimated to be in the range of 3.8-4.2 depending on the 
                                                 
7 When inflation is introduced without its square value, the sign of the coefficient is counterintuitive, which may 
be an indication of the presence of a non-linear relationship. 13 
 
 
indicator of financial structure used, which is the level of India, Argentina, Uganda, or 
Turkey for instance (countries are ranked from 0 to 6, see Annex 1 for the list of countries 
and their average Rule of Law index during 1984-2008). Figure 1 illustrates the relationship 
between financial structure, institutional quality and poverty as implied by the specification 
in column 8 of Table 2. It clearly shows that poverty levels would be high in countries with 
both weak institutional quality and market-based financial systems, while poverty levels 
would fall with improving institutional quality in market-based financial systems.  
 
Figure 1. Poverty Headcount Ratio as a Function of Financial Structure and Institutional Quality (regression 
column 8, Table 2) 
 
 
Robustness tests and use of other indicators of absolute and relative poverty 
 
To test for the robustness of the results:
 8 
 
  We added control variables that might affect poverty levels such as education level 
(measured by either primary or secondary school enrolment rate), level of remittances 
and government expenditures, both as a share of GDP. The results remained 
unchanged.  
  In addition, our findings remain unchanged when controlling for the level of lagged 
poverty headcount ratio, and when introducing GDP per capita as an interaction 
variable with the financial structure.
9 
                                                 






















































  We removed outliers without altering the previous conclusions.
10 
  Finally, we used alternative measures of absolute and relative poverty. The results 
using the poverty gap confirmed the observations for the poverty headcount ratio, 
while the financial structure does not matter much for relative poverty measured by 
either the average income of the poorest quintile or the Gini coefficient. This may 
suggest that the impact of financial structure on poverty is mainly felt by households 
close to the poverty line. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the link between financial structure and poverty in a sample of 
developing economies over the period 1984 to 2008. It pays particular attention to the role of 
institutions and their interaction with the structure of the financial system. The results suggest 
that overall a more bank-based financial system is associated with lower levels of poverty. 
They also indicate that the contribution of more market-based systems increases with 
institutions growing stronger. In this regard, the results are consistent with the views that 
banks play an important role at earlier stages of economic development, when institutions are 
still weak, particularly those related to property rights. 
  
Accounting for the quality of institutions helps better understand the complexity of the 
relationship between financial structure and poverty. It stresses the importance to carry out 
institutional reforms such as stronger property rights as the financial sector develops. Only if 
these reforms take place, can a move to a more market-based financial system benefit a 




   
                                                                                                                                                       
9 This probably reflects the fact that countries with stronger institutions tend to have higher income levels. 
10 Using the specification in column 8 of Table 2, outliers are defined as all country observations for which the 
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Table 1. Financial Structure and Poverty Incidence 
 
 
Log of Poverty Headcount (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GDP per capita (log) -1.087 -1.088 -1.082 -1.136 -1.111 -1.190 -1.191
[0.135]*** [0.133]*** [0.137]*** [0.108]*** [0.120]*** [0.129]*** [0.128]***
Inflation (log) -2.903 -2.844 -3.343 -2.786 -2.800 -2.753 -2.887
[0.770]*** [0.711]*** [0.730]*** [0.720]*** [0.704]*** [0.691]*** [0.660]***
Inflation squared (log) 1.893 1.856 2.090 1.729 1.731 1.707 1.782
[0.464]*** [0.431]*** [0.440]*** [0.449]*** [0.437]*** [0.426]*** [0.412]***
Trade openness 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Road/area -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]* [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
Stock market development -0.240 -0.283 0.243 0.656 0.597 0.545 0.558
[0.551] [0.533] [0.569] [0.369]* [0.442] [0.365] [0.396]
Banking sector development -1.970 -2.084 -2.615 -2.345 -2.615 -2.374 -2.457















Constant 11.861 11.951 12.327 12.838 12.680 13.258 13.332
[1.125]*** [1.093]*** [1.091]*** [0.931]*** [1.016]*** [1.091]*** [1.066]***
Observations 121 121 121 118 118 111 111
Number of countries 47 47 47 45 45 43 43
Sargan/Hansen test 0.69 0.69 0.65 0.75 0.71 0.84 0.83
AR2 0.13 0.09 0.15 0.30 0.55 0.22 0.25
The result are obtained using the one-step System GMM estimator; Robust standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%21 
 
 




Log of Poverty Headcount (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP per capita (log) -1.079 -1.253 -1.333 -1.347 -0.873 -0.990 -1.050 -1.054
[0.135]*** [0.116]*** [0.137]*** [0.139]*** [0.132]*** [0.121]*** [0.122]*** [0.123]***
Inflation (log) -2.924 -2.430 -2.523 -2.583 -2.172 -2.237 -1.967 -2.135
[0.744]*** [0.678]*** [0.672]*** [0.676]*** [0.679]*** [0.769]*** [0.696]*** [0.713]***
Inflation squared (log) 1.905 1.500 1.570 1.616 1.313 1.369 1.171 1.291
[0.443]*** [0.434]*** [0.425]*** [0.424]*** [0.418]*** [0.492]*** [0.432]*** [0.444]***
Trade openness 0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Road/area -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
Stock market development -0.401 0.616 0.567 0.523 0.682 0.366 0.524 0.449
[0.574] [0.384] [0.397] [0.421] [0.419] [0.351] [0.301]* [0.323]
Banking sector development -2.039 -1.817 -1.966 -1.987 -1.912 -1.898 -2.021 -2.072
[0.720]*** [0.740]** [0.737]*** [0.743]*** [0.632]*** [0.587]*** [0.578]*** [0.575]***
Composite indicator of structure-size 0.373 0.371
[0.209]* [0.239]
Composite indicator of structure-activity 0.036 0.589
[0.070] [0.261]**
Composite indicator of structure-efficiency 0.062 0.523
[0.079] [0.220]**
Overall measure of financial structure 0.095 0.599
[0.094] [0.231]***
Institutions - Law and order (ICRG) -0.237 -0.199 -0.141 -0.150
[0.072]*** [0.068]*** [0.078]* [0.078]*
Composite indicator of structure-size*Institutions -0.147
[0.071]**
Composite indicator of structure-activity*Institutions -0.139
[0.065]**
Composite indicator of structure-efficiency*Institutions -0.136
[0.050]***
Overall measure of financial structure*Institutions -0.146
[0.052]***
Constant 12.203 13.775 14.447 14.584 11.123 12.050 12.269 12.394
[1.081]*** [0.998]*** [1.167]*** [1.198]*** [1.068]*** [0.990]*** [1.030]*** [1.021]***
Observations 121 118 111 111 116 114 107 107
Number of countries 47 45 43 43 44 43 41 41
Sargan/Hansen test 0.78 0.58 0.62 0.64 0.78 0.90 0.68 0.71
AR2 0.07 0.26 0.27 0.31 0.72 0.48 0.35 0.29
The result are obtained using the one-step System GMM estimator; Robust standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
 

































































Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Povery incidence 121 18.58 20.18 2.00 88.52
Income of the poorest quintile 120 5.35 2.10 1.47 9.93
Poverty gap 121 6.63 9.00 0.50 47.74
Gini 107 44.09 9.22 27.17 62.00
Stock market capitalization/GDP 121 0.30 0.40 0.01 2.24
Private credit/GDP 121 0.32 0.25 0.04 1.39
Liquid liabilities 121 0.43 0.26 0.15 1.25
GDP per capita 121 4685.77 3242.74 639.90 15335.97
Inflation 121 19.61 44.81 0.89 433.56
Trade openness 121 72.32 38.49 16.27 208.55
Road/area 121 33.09 40.12 1.84 169.47
Structure-size 1 121 0.92 0.77 0.02 3.63
Structure-size 2 121 0.68 0.59 0.02 2.95
Structure-size 3 121 0.76 0.69 0.01 3.50
Structure-activity 1 118 0.31 0.54 0.00 3.15
Structure-activity 2 118 0.13 0.25 0.00 1.44
Structure-efficiency 1 111 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04
Structure-efficiency 2 111 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Povery incidence (1) 1
Income of the poorest quintile (2) 0.08 1
Poverty gap (3) 0.94 -0.06 1
Gini (4) -0.09 -0.91 0.01 1
Stock market capitalization/GDP (5) -0.21 -0.01 -0.22 0.11 1
Private credit/GDP (6) -0.34 -0.04 -0.32 0.08 0.63 1
Liquid liabilities/GDP (7) -0.33 0.23 -0.34 -0.17 0.62 0.84 1
GDP per capita (8) -0.59 -0.21 -0.49 0.17 0.26 0.14 0.02 1
Inflation (9) -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.12 -0.15 -0.19 0.06 1
Trade openness (10) -0.11 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.32 0.51 0.47 0.04 -0.20 1
Road/area (11) -0.04 0.40 -0.11 -0.39 -0.09 -0.14 -0.09 0.10 0.05 -0.02 1
Structure-size 1 (12) -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.08 0.62 0.02 0.08 0.26 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 1
Structure-size 2 (13) -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 0.12 0.71 0.13 0.14 0.27 -0.08 0.04 -0.08 0.95 1
Structure-size 3 (14) -0.10 -0.15 -0.11 0.22 0.75 0.21 0.12 0.36 -0.05 -0.01 -0.11 0.89 0.93 1
Structure-activity 1 (15) -0.13 0.22 -0.19 -0.18 0.38 0.10 0.17 0.23 0.03 -0.11 0.07 0.43 0.36 0.38 1
Structure-activity 2 (16) -0.16 0.22 -0.20 -0.18 0.68 0.41 0.49 0.18 -0.05 0.16 0.03 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.86 1
Structure-efficiency 1 (17) -0.20 0.04 -0.23 0.04 0.61 0.27 0.25 0.37 0.10 -0.03 -0.01 0.53 0.52 0.59 0.82 0.79 1
Structure-efficiency 2 (18) -0.21 0.06 -0.24 0.02 0.63 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.85 0.87 0.94 1   
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Appendix 3. Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Variables Definition Data sources
Poverty incidence
The percentage of the population living below 
the $1/day international poverty line
Poverty gap
The average shortfall of the poor with respect to 
the poverty line, multiplied by the headcount 
ratio 
Log of income of the poorest 20%
Log of average incomes in bottom quintile, 
constant 1985 USD at PPP
Dollar and Kraay (2002), and World Development 
Indicators 
Gini
The Gini coefficient is the ratio of the area 
between the Lorenz Curve, which plots share of 
population against income share received, to the 
area below the diagonal. It lies between 0 and 1, 
where 0 is perfect equality and 1 is perfect 
inequality.
World Income Distribution (Milanovic, 2005, 
updated in 2010)
GDP per capita Nominal GDP divided by population size
Trade openness
Sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services as share of GDP
Inflation rate Growth of consumer price index
Road density
The ratio of total road network (km) to country's 
total area (square km)
Institutions
Law and Order captures the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system, and popular 
observance of the law. Its values range from 0 to 
6, with a higher figure indicating a better quality 
and enforcement of the legal system.
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
Private credit/GDP Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks to GDP
Liquid liabilities/GDP
Currency plus demand and interest-bearing 
liabilities of banks and other financial 
intermediaries divided by GDP
Bank assets/GDP
Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by 
deposit money banks as a share of GDP
Bank deposits/GDP
Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit 
money banks as a share of GDP
Stock market capitalization/GDP Value of listed shares to GDP
Stock market value traded/GDP
Total shares traded on the stock market 
exchange to GDP
Bank loans to deposits
Total credit by deposit money banks as share of 
their total deposits
Overhead costs
Accounting value of a bank's overhead costs as 
a share of its total assets.
Net interest margin
Accounting value of bank's net interest revenue 
as a share of its interest-bearing (total earning) 
World Bank Global Poverty Index Database 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/povmonitor
International Financial Statistics and World 
Development Indicators 
Financial Structure Database 2010